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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Thought and Things of Genetic Logic. Vol. II., Experimental Logic. JAMES MARK BALDWIN. London: Swann Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Pp. xv + 436. There are three appendices and a fair index to the first two volumes.

This is the second of three volumes, appearing in French, German, and English, on the subject of genetic logic, a subject never before so comprehensively treated by an American author. It follows throughout the genetic method of tracing out the successive stages in the embodiment of belief. It is logic from the point of view of the knower rather than that of the analyst who only looks on from the outside. As conceived by Baldwin the process of knowing has for the knower characters which it does not have for the outsider. For the knower it involves continual reference to similar processes dealing with the same material and going on either actually or possibly in other minds. For the knower it also involves reference to the "external control" of things. This dualism of inner, personal, or social, and outer or external controls is the characteristic presupposition of the book, as it was also of volume one, but we are warned against supposing that Baldwin asserts these two controls as realities. They exist only "for consciousness," for the knower, and, however essential they seem to the knower and the knowledge process, I suppose that in the author's third volume on "Real Logic" the dualism will be interpreted as phenomenal. "The dualism of control is all the while 'for consciousness,' not for our final theory of reality" (p. 5, note). Italics are used in the text "because of certain misconceptions of the theory of control worked out in volume one."

Nevertheless, certain things in this book are calculated to give rise to misunderstanding on this point. Take, for example, the statement on page 25: "Moreover, experience, of which each judged content is part, is a whole of inner meaning, a life of ideas, and this meaning is controlled by the subject-self functioning for the realization of its interests and purposes. It would seem then to be altogether true that judgment is self-assertion." "The self is the *subject-agent* of judgment, but not commonly the *subject-matter*, the psychic subject, not the logical subject" (p. 28). "The subject of control claims and owns the entire organization of ideas as its experience—as making up its very self, the 'me' of the whole of experience. It thus becomes at once available for ejection. All other selves are subjects also, and all subjects are subjects of experience; the whole of experience is yours as well as mine unless there be characters of personal or private meaning which I have right and reason to reserve from the body of my ejection" (p. 65). The doctrine seems to run through the entire book, but we say "seems" because Baldwin, in the passages referred to above and in a personal letter, denies that he believes the dualism of controls to be real or to have an existence of any sort except "for consciousness." This complicates the whole dis-

tion between subject and object, between consciousness and its world. On page 289 two different kinds of persistence are spoken of, outer and inner. Outer or external persistence is "sameness-of-recurrence" of an object which also has the meaning "sameness-when-absent." External sameness is identified by recurrence and the testimony of others, or "secondary conversion." "In the matter of inner identity, however, the procedure is not the same; we neither wait for recurrence, nor do we ask our neighbors. We find in the immediately persisting and continuous mental life the experience that enables us to call the self identical." Is this distinction between outer and inner identity only phenomenal? Nothing in the language of the immediate text suggests that it is. On page 328 occurs the statement, "This is to say that reflection in fact can not dispense with one of its criteria, the dualism of self and the objects of thought." On page 379, "Facts enter as control over ideas; but ideas also mediate relative control of the self over facts." Does this mean that all this seems to the knower to be the case, but that really it is not the case?

One other source of difficulty to the present reader in connection with this whole doctrine of control is the fact that Baldwin attacks the doctrines of control held by other writers because they are not dualistic. Indeed, in stating Dewey's conception of control, "The 'control' of the 'Studies in Logical Theory' and other works of the Chicago School so-called," Baldwin practically identifies it with his own doctrine of "inner control." "It is control of a personal sort" (p. 349). It is not "knowledge through control" (Baldwin's view) but "control through knowledge"; "but here it may be easily seen that the 'control' to the latter theory is the 'inner' or personal control of the former—one only of the sorts of control found actual by the present writer" (p. 349). Now for the writers of "the Chicago School so-called" control is neither inner, nor outer, nor both. Their doctrine simply can not be stated in terms of Baldwin's conception of dual control, especially when this dualism of controls exists all the while only "for consciousness, not for our final theory of reality." But when Baldwin compares his own conception with that of Dewey, without mentioning that his own dualism of controls exists only for the knowing processes and not really, he ought not to be surprised if some of us are misled. Notwithstanding his expressed "hope" (p. 349, note) that "he may not be found to misrepresent these authors," the present reviewer finds that his account of them positively refuses to be characterized as anything but a misrepresentation. Moreover, when Baldwin goes on to say (p. 360, note), "See the exposition of Miss Adams's 'The *Æsthetic Experience*.' I suppose Miss Adams's is an accredited exposition—and I should say a very clear and able one—of the position of Professor Dewey and his colleagues," one wonders at the term "accredited exposition of the position of Professor Dewey and his colleagues," and wonders whether "these authors" and Baldwin are addressing themselves to the same problem at all. Does Baldwin mean that his doctrine of dual control is not true? Or does he mean that there are two kinds of truth, namely, relative or phenomenal truth for the con-

sciousness of the knower, and a real truth to which this dualism of controls is foreign? Perhaps the latter, but in that case how can his own dual control be compared at all with the doctrine of control of "the Chicago School"?

In explaining the subtitle of this volume Baldwin writes: "The logical operations as such, considered as the essential method of advance or progress in the mode of thought, proceed by experimentation, or, to use the more special term, employed in the first volume of this work (Chap. VIII., §§ 6 ff.), by a process of schematism. This consists essentially in the *experimental* erection of an object already made-up in consciousness, and its treatment as having a meaning or value which *it has not yet been found to have* with the expectation and intent that in the result it may be found to have it" (p. 4). But while schematism and experimentation are the essential method of advance in knowledge, judgment does not appear until they have been passed. The stages in the advance are schematism, direct experimentation, generalization, and judgment. Like Mill, Baldwin confines the logical to the sphere of established implications. Logical judgment is always the embodiment of belief. The general, the concrete, and the logical are all retrospective, while schematism is always prospective. Contents are retrospective, intent and control are always prospective. And yet, "no predicated or judged knowledge is ever free from that instrumental and problematical reference which one or other of these tests would further fulfill. Either that which is reasonable is still to be elucidated for some mode of acceptance, or that which is generally accepted is still to be proposed for individual confirmation as reasonable" (p. 164). All logical meanings have two aspects, the one accommodative, experimental, prospective, and the other habitual, relational, retrospective (p. 165).

There are two sorts of schematism, namely, the recognitive or scientific and the selective or appreciative. In so far as they become subject-matter of judgment, selective meanings are recognitive, appreciations are truths (p. 8 ff.). Both are purposive, but scientific schematism alone must agree with facts and satisfy the theoretic or knowing interest. Four kinds of interest are distinguished, namely, the "practical," the "pragmatic" (which is the practical interest considered from the objective or psychological point of view), the "theoretic," and the "pragmatelic" (which is interest in the system of knowledge as satisfying, fulfilling, consequential, etc.). "'Practical' interest is that which motives the mass of contents of cognition and action fused together in their early flow and development" (p. 10). These four are the practical and theoretic interests viewed now as motives to action (using the words broadly) and now as psychological phenomena possessing certain values. The former view is recognitive, the latter selective. The two types of schematism are named, in the prelogical mode, presumption and lower assumption, and in the logical mode, presupposition and higher assumption. A child presumes the existence of a toy for which it cries: it assumes a control when it tries to "feed" its doll. We presuppose the law of conservation in physics: we assume a control in the illusion of the theater. This is

an adaptation of Meinong's distinction between *Annahme* and *Voraussetzung*, an adaptation to the "inner" and "outer" controls and the distinction between prelogical and logical modes which are presupposed throughout this volume.

Section three of chapter two classifies modes of control as a basis for classifying modes of belief. (1) Direct internal and external control issuing in assertorial forms of judgment, such as, "John is a good fellow";¹ (2) semblant and other selective controls issuing in appreciative judgments, "Let us pretend John is a good fellow," "Hurrah for John who is a good fellow"; (3) alternative control issuing in disjunctive judgments, "Either he is a good fellow or my informant is mistaken"; (4) experimental or schematic control issuing in the hypothesis, "Suppose he is a good fellow," and the interrogative, "Is he a good fellow?" (5) the attitude toward accidental or *anomic* constructions expressed in such statements as "I dreamed he was a good fellow," "What a conceit, fancy him a good fellow!" Every shade of attitude toward earlier meanings is comprehended in this scheme, and hence the spheres of reality, possibility, and unreality, the spheres of modality (p. 38). Appreciative meanings are always immediate: they are not under various controls, but are added to each of them (p. 43). Possibility or partial belief is expressed in experimental, disjunctive, and conditional statements, and disjunctive meanings are either exclusive, indefinite, or inclusive. Disjunction expresses belief in a whole of uncertain content, while the conditional judgment expresses belief in a definite content of an uncertain whole. The former is genetically the earlier. This chapter follows Venn to some extent.

Chapter three investigates "common acceptance and acknowledgment," or what we might call the social character of knowledge. All judgment as such is syndoxic, *i. e.*, its meanings are not only held in common, but held as common (p. 60). Mind content is always syndoxic because ejective (p. 64). In so far as it is singular, a meaning represents a variation toward the fulfillment of a special personal interest or the satisfaction of a caprice. Singularity is either "essential," imposed by external control, or "imported" and due to selective interest or internal and private control. In the former case it is in community one with the universal, the difference between them being the difference between a group of different objects with the same meaning and a group of recurrences of the same object with the same meaning. In the latter case it is not logical. Like the schematic and the self-identical subject, it is allogical or superlogical. Section three of chapter three distinguishes between meanings which are actually and aggregately held in common (the earlier form of syndoxity) and those which are syndoxic only in the sense of being fit or appropriate for actual holding in common (synomic syndoxity).

On the one hand, "the persistence of a world of minds becomes, then, as soon as I reflect and judge, a *presupposition* of my judgment" (p. 93). "A judgment which constitutes a meaning as universal for a process of

¹ The illustrations are mine.

thought, also universalizes the process of thought by which that meaning is constituted" (p. 63). On the other hand, the private individual and the private judgment alike are treated as a sort of precipitate or crystallization of a universal mental medium. To this manifold of minds face to face with a common external world is due the dual character of all logical meanings as both experimental and relational, both elucidative and proposive, both retrospective and prospective. "The solution is to be found only in an experience that is not indeed *a-logical* but *super-logical* and immediate in its mode—to anticipate our discussions of 'Real Logic'" (p. 165, note).

In chapter four the problematical is defined to comprehend both the disjunctive and the contingent. The former has a definite control, but expresses as yet indefinite internal relations. In the contingent judgment the internal relations of the content are very definite while the control is undetermined. The former is a judgment with presupposition: the latter, a judgment with postulate. Presupposition is an attitude of acceptance: postulation, one of assumption.

There follows a discussion of quantitative distinctions. These express judgments of possibility, probability, and improbability, and cover a wide range of degrees, "one," "a few," "some," "half," "many," "most," and "all." The unquantified universal, such as, "Virtue is praiseworthy," is intensive in meaning while quantified universals are extensive. The same is true of quantified and unquantified singulars (p. 122 f.).

Chapter five deals with the contingent. Presupposition is the acknowledgment of the contingent as holding in some implied sphere of control: postulation, the contingent acknowledgment of an implication which may hold in some sphere or other. All presupposition is implication, part of the intent, of the subject-matter, of the judgment:² it may itself become subject-matter in existential judgments (p. 134). In postulation the mode of existence is undetermined and the whole meaning is schematic.

Chapter six has to do with the development of logical meaning through predication and intercourse. Language embodies social habit: social accommodation is effected through speech and intercourse. Elucidation and proposal are the two motives of logical intercourse, the former being retrospective and the latter prospective. There are no judgments which are purely elucidative to both speaker and hearer.

Chapter seven has to do with the development of logical meaning by *terms*. Section four deals with abstraction, pointing out that selective meaning is its basis and repeating that selective meaning always embodies individual and personal disposition and interest. Not that certain meanings are selected for abstraction, but rather that logical meanings are abstracted by a process of selection (p. 186). In an interesting section Baldwin points out that singularization is not a process of individuation in extension, that the singular has properly no extension. The correlation of the concrete and the abstract is only another illustration

² Why then is not control an implication, part of the content or subject-matter of judgment?

of the dual character of all logical meanings, a character of which the recognitive and the selective, the retrospective and the prospective, elucidation and proposal, implication and experimentation, content and control, the habitual and the accommodative, presupposition and higher assumption, the analytic and the synthetic, the static and the processional, etc., are other illustrations. It is the distinction which, as a distinction in functions, has played so large a part in the logic of the Chicago School.

In chapter eight proposition is defined as "that mode of predication in which relation is individuated as a meaning" (p. 211), but the relation is not expressed in the copula, it is embodied in the predicate (p. 262). The characters of propositions are grouped under two main heads as content-wise and control-wise. Each comprehends three characters. From the point of view of control or belief, these are modality (telling where or in what sphere the meaning is valid), quantity (telling how much), and community (telling by whom): from the standpoint of the content or relations expressed, quality (telling what), relational character (telling why), and community (telling for whom) (pp. 212-15). This chapter is chiefly devoted to the subject of quality, and of the two, to negation. Limitation is here recognized as a quality distinct from both affirmation and negation. The limitation of a cognitive field motives the distinction of quality as affirmative and negative. But limitation may be selective, as well as recognitive, and in that case we have "the intentional exclusion of whatever else there is except what is then and there selected." This is privative or imperative negation. Both types of exclusion are applied to singulars. The singular may be exclusive for either reason. The only "pure exclusion" is the denial of one singular of another, as, "John is not James." The imperative privative, such as "Let *A* be *B* and nothing else," is the case of the will-to-believe, and so far as it is intended to advance the meaning of *A* it is a pure proposal. But really it is not logical, because it is not an experimental proposal. It is really a will-to-deny that *A* is anything but *B*, without regard to evidence, and hence it is dogmatic and obstructive.

Chapter nine, on the import and character of the proposition, identifies synthetic with proposive judgments, and analytic with elucidative. All judgments have both characters. No one can express what he has not conceived and the proposal motives the redistribution of elements whose issue is a new stage of conception (pp. 245-46). Negation always denies synthesis or proposal and is analytic (p. 249). All judgments equally, whether affirmative or negative, intend existence (p. 256). All quantified affirmative propositions presuppose existence. To deny a meaning is to reject it from a control, not to reject the control. Disbelief is a form of belief: the opposite of belief is doubt.

This discussion concludes the second part of the book entitled "Genetic Theory of Thought and Knowledge: How Thinking Goes On." It is the largest and on all accounts the best part of the work. It makes the book worth while. Indeed, the discussion of the negative alone is reason enough why it should be carefully studied. Part one is a single intro-

ductory chapter. Part three is devoted to the subject of implication as a necessary relation of the elements of a whole of logical meaning to each other. Two great characters of propositions are fundamental: one dynamic, synthetic, developmental, the character of wholes as such; the other static, analytic, implicative, the character of relations established within wholes (p. 272). The former receives the general name of "modality," and the latter, "relation." These are of course the same as the reconstructive and habitual aspects of logical meaning pointed out by the Chicago School of logicians. The former character, called control in earlier chapters of the book, is the main theme of eight of the first nine chapters. Hence, in part three, the discussion takes up the other theme, devoting chapters ten, eleven and twelve to it.

"Every implication is a subject-matter identical with itself, different from or exclusive of any other, and, taken together with its contradictory, exhaustive of the sphere of control in which they are both found" (p. 283). There is no *a priori* law of identity above and beyond the individuation of an object of thought as such. Its being identical and its being an object of thought are one and the same thing, namely, its being this object and not any other. Implication grows by judgments of identity.

In chapter eleven induction is treated. It is the transition from pre-logical sameness in difference to logical identity and difference, and it issues in logical classification, ordination and definition. It is the experimental establishing of judgments of identity. "When may I be sure that among the varieties of natural happenings I have found a recurring, persistent, and invariable grouping of facts?" To answer this question "a meaning already achieved is used experimentally to secure by further experience the definition and limitation of its comprehension" (p. 303 f.). But in formulating this method more exactly, Baldwin falls back on Mill's canons of induction and apparently accepts them without modification, although he supplements them as we shall see. Now Mill's methods are for the discovery of invariable sequences, to the neglect of coexistences, an oversight that has persisted in inductive logic even in this discussion of Baldwin. Moreover, they are methods of elimination and presuppose a system of nature made up of a manifold of kinds and causal agents which are self-identical and already known. They assume that the data of induction are the same as the content of the judgment of identity which results from them. Mill's canons were deduced from this *a priori* conception of nature or the objects under investigation. They are not derived by generalization from actual scientific procedure. Consequently they are largely deductive methods, presupposing as they do that we already know the nature of the elements of the phenomena under investigation. It will be found upon investigation that the method of induction outlined by Baldwin (pp. 304-07) is also essentially deductive. I know by agreement that "man is vocal whenever I find him"; and by difference that "the not-vocal wherever I find it is not man." "I could not then say," writes Baldwin, "that men who are non-vocal might not still be come upon. But if I now have an experience that correlates non-speech, as in the anthropoids, with certain anatomical characters which also ex-

clude some of the essential marks of man, I can then say 'the non-vocal are not-man' reaching the exhaustive limitative judgment 'man is not non-vocal' or 'man is vocal.' . . . We can now say 'man must be articulate, for to take speech from him places him in another anatomical class than that of man'" (p. 306). Let us suppose that the crucial anatomical characteristic is the absence of a certain palate. How do I come by the information that the absence of a palate is universally characteristic of not-men, and that its presence is a universal characteristic of man, and that it is universally correlated with speech? Is it not evident, if Baldwin's method is to be followed, that before we can establish by induction any one of these judgments we must establish some other *a priori* judgment of identity upon which to base them, and so on *ad infinitum*? Is not the judgment, "man is not non-vocal," according to Baldwin's method, an obvious deduction? If we have *a priori* grounds for correlating non-speech with certain anatomical characters which exclude man from the class of non-speaking animals, we may then *deduce* analytically the conclusion that man is not non-speaking; but in that case the inductive methods of agreement and difference are entirely superfluous; while, in the absence of any such *a priori* correlation, induction, as outlined by Baldwin, is a futile regress of inductions to back up inductions.

The discussion of deduction fails to bring out the close and vital relation of the process to induction in scientific procedure. Indeed the book makes no serious attempt to treat either of these great topics. They are classed under the head of implication and left to the treatises on formal logic. The present reviewer feels that Baldwin has handled a great theme seriously up to the point where its climax should begin, and there the discussion dwindles into sketchy commonplaces.

Part four, including chapters thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen, is devoted to the dualisms and limitations of thought. For the most part it is a discussion of what Baldwin calls pragmatism. It identifies pragmatism with his own doctrine of "inner control" and treats it as though the pragmatists held that that is the only control—an altogether disappointing procedure.

This paper is already too long, but we can not conclude without a brief word as to the most characteristic feature of this book, the doctrine of control. To me it is the name of a problem which Baldwin has not gone to the bottom of. Whence are these "spheres of control" so often appealed to? What is their justification? The book contains no thorough-going answer to these questions. Their relations to the real are reserved for treatment in the third volume. But is it possible to treat experimental logic thoroughly without discussing them? They are the very universes of discourse which make exhaustive judgments of limitation possible and we have seen that in the discussion of induction they are simply assumed. Nevertheless, it repays study, and we are sorry to leave the subject with this note of regret.

G. A. TAWNEY.